Forging a Transatlantic Strategy for Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

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The US and Europe has done well in dealing with the first phase of the “war on terrorism” that has followed the tragedy of September 11th. The Transatlantic relationship has always worked best in a crisis. At the same time, 2002 will be a critical test of whether they can forge a more lasting a deeper effort to deal with the twin challenges of terrorism and asymmetric warfare.

The West as a whole has been shown to be vulnerable to sudden massive covert attacks as well as to slow, low-level attacks with biological weapons. If the US and Europe are to forge a successful Transatlantic strategy for dealing with these issues, they must do more than simply respond to the current crisis, the must look toward a future in which they will face a constant threat of asymmetric attacks from both terrorist groups and states.

**Reversing Transatlantic Vulnerability, and the Impact of “Globalism”**

This threat does have a new character. In many ways, the balance of danger has reversed itself from the time of the Cold War. It was Europe that was the first line of attack during the Cold War. This time it is the US.

There are a number of reasons for this shift. The US is widely viewed in the developing world as the West’s “superpower,” and as the embodiment of foreign interference and of Western power projection. The US is also the symbol of the secular and economic forces that are imposing outside change on many previously isolated or static societies. While the European Union is becoming an economic bloc that may well become as, or more important than, the US economy, the US is still perceived as the symbol of Western secular values and the economic globalism that is changing the world.

This does not mean that Europe is immune or will not be a major partner. Many European states have long faced many terrorist threats of their own. European states are deeply involved in the tensions of the Balkans and North Africa, and has been involved in both combat and nation-building in Afghanistan. No one can rule out future attacks on Europe. Al Qaida planned major operations in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy as well as the US.

There are conflicts within Europe and on the fringe of Europe and Europe may become a proxy target for the US. If Northern Ireland has been the most visible source of terrorist attacks in Europe, there are also powerful local terrorist movements in nations like Spain and Turkey. Furthermore, nations like France and Germany have also been the scene of terrorist attacks with their origin in the Middle East.

As the world is rapidly learning, the particular target of massive acts or terrorism also may not matter even if such attacks do focus on striking the US. The world’s reliance on a global economy means that any terrorist or asymmetric attack that
weakens the US economy spills over immediately into both Europe’s economy and that of the developing world. The same, of course, would be true of any attack massive enough to disrupt the economy of a major European state.

Mass terrorism that reinforces a recession in any major industrialized state not only hurts every developed power, but may ultimately hurt those in developing countries even more. Nations as far from New York as China, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand are already paying the cost of the destruction of the World Trade Center, the damage to the Pentagon, and the use of anthrax.

The Impact of Technology: Bioweapons, Information Warfare and Financial Systems, and Global Transportation

A western strategy to deal with terrorism and state-driven asymmetric attacks must look far beyond the immediate tactical challenges of dealing with Al Qaida and the Taliban. It must seek to create lasting institutions to improve the first against terrorism and prepare capabilities for asymmetric warfare.

Equally important, a Western strategy must consider three major ongoing changes in technology that will continue to reshape the world for as far into the future as anyone can see:

- **Advances in biotechnology, advanced food processing, and pharmaceuticals are steadily increasing the ease with which both terrorists and states can manufacture lethal biological agents and do so all over the world. At the same time, a broader process of proliferation, is increasing the threat from other weapons of mass destruction.**

  The full impact of the proliferation of genetic engineering may be a decade or half-decade away, but the once esoteric equipment needed to make dry, storable biological weapons with the lethality of small nuclear weapons has already proliferated through much of the world.

  At the same time, nature is also an enemy. Progressively more lethal strains of disease are emerging throughout the developing world. The World Health Organization and the CIA both warned of a continuing threat to the West from natural causes long before Anthrax was used in a terrorist attack in the US. A National Intelligence Council study, issued in January 2000, warned that twenty well-known diseases--including tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and cholera--have reemerged or spread geographically since 1973, often in more virulent and drug-resistant forms. Furthermore, at least 30 previously unknown disease agents have been identified since 1973, including HIV, Ebola, hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which no cures are available.
As Britain and Taiwan have learned at immense cost, biotechnology can attack agriculture as well. Even moderate outbreaks of natural disease can easily cost billions of dollars and have a powerful political and social impact.

There are other threats from chemical and nuclear weapons. While so-called “fourth generation” chemical weapons remain so secret that governments will not talk about them even in broad terms, some developing nations already are developing them, and doing so in ways that are not covered by chemical weapons. At some point in the next decade, they too will be common knowledge.

No major advances are taking place in the ease with which fissile material can be manufactured, but there is still the issue of the Russian stockpile, and the emergence of new risks like Pakistan. Moreover, every other aspect of nuclear weapons manufacture is becoming more commercially available from triggering devices to the ability to make and test high explosive lenses.

These emerging threats interact with changes in international transport and trade. Long-range ballistic missiles, and the steady commercialization of the technology for cruise missiles and drones, is a threat in itself. So, however, is commercial shipping. Any shipping container can be equipped with GPS to explode just before it goes through customs. Most shipping containers are never really inspected, and no commercial screening device can as yet reliably detect a biological agent – and even amounts less than 100 kilograms can produce massive amounts of damage.

- **Advances in information systems, and the steady integration of world trading and financial systems, are steadily increasing vulnerability to cyberwarfare and terrorism.**

Constant attacks by crackers and cybercriminals have already become routine, but states and terrorist groups have the potential to use such technology to do far more damage. No one has to attack a nation or physical target directly and visibly as was done in attacking the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Indirect attacks on information systems can be just as damaging to an economy, government, and the social order.

This form of asymmetric warfare is a very much a matter of personal skill, almost an art form. A small terrorist group may be as effective as a state, although sustained mass attacks remain an attractive form of state asymmetric warfare. It also may not matter much to the West whether key information systems and trading and financial systems are attacked in New York, Frankfurt, or London.

At the same time, direct physical attacks on key information, trading, and financial systems are also possible. Here, a combination of technology, engineering, and cost-considerations has acted to created more an more
dependence on critical utilities, facilities that house critical communications
gear and node in networks, and places where large numbers of skilled
human beings interface with such systems. Wall Street and nuclear power
plants are just two examples of such critical infrastructure.

Furthermore, the problem of insuring against all of the risks of terrorism and
asymmetric warfare – and the future role of states in ensuring the viability of
what has become a global insurance business – is becoming a challenge in
itself. Insurance must deal with both information systems and virtually every
form of major terrorist or state-driven asymmetric physical attack, and it is
unclear that any one nation in the West can afford to secure its national
insurance industry against such risks.

• **Advances in global transportation systems create another mix of
vulnerabilities.**

Western dependence on key transportation systems like jet aircraft, container
vessels, and tankers is projected to grow steadily and do so indefinitely into
the future. As we saw all too clearly on September 11th, however, virtually
every major transportation system we depend on for international commerce
can be transformed into a weapon. So can any interference in the growth and
flow of such systems.

A passenger or cargo aircraft can become a transatlantic guided missile
without warning. A LNG or LPG tanker can attack any crowded port. A cargo
vessel can become a delivery system for a weapon in a container. Biological
weapons to attack people or agriculture can be concealed in virtually any form
of container.

At the same time, any attack on key trading systems like the flow of oil exports
– or even a long-term interruption in the growth of air traffic – can have a
major impact on the West as a whole. An asymmetric attack that destroyed a
single major Saudi oil port like Ras Tanura would attack the entire West as
effectively as a similar asymmetric attack on the US or Europe.

It would be nice if the United States and Europe could deal with the present crisis
in narrow terms. In practice, however, such a strategy is virtually certain to fail. In
many cases, it simply is not cost-effective to solve only part of the problem when
marginal increases in effort could deal with a much wider range of risks. In many
other cases, the lead-times for effective action are too long to wait.

More generally, Western vulnerability is no longer a matter of theory and the
perceived constraints on the use of truly lethal methods of attack like biological
weapons have been severely undermined. A workable Western strategy must
address the entire problem or be the prelude to further and possibly far more
dangerous attacks.
First Things First: Defeating Bin Laden, Al Qaida, and the Taliban

The US and Europe do need to put first things first, and some of the priorities are obvious. No broader strategy can work unless they succeed in winning a decisive victory over Bin Laden, Al Qaida, and the Taliban and then exploit it ways that both reassure the Islamic world and deter future acts of terrorism.

This may require a European lead in nation building that will be as important in creating any kind of grand strategic victory as US-led military operations have been in winning a strategic victory.

Military cooperation has been important. Joint US and British military action put the conflict on an alliance basis. So did the offer of NATO support and the provision of NATO E-3A AWACS; the provision of Turkish (and Islamic) special forces; the provision of Australian, German, Italian forces; and the offer of additional forces by other countries.

There are important practical lessons to be learned on both sides of the Atlantic. The US should have been prepared to rapidly integrate European forces into its operations and give such coalition operations “Atlantic” visibility. It was too slow and too parochial in taking advantage of allied contributions. European countries need to reassess their real world capabilities to conduct such operations and their ability to operate outside NATO in a very different command and control, communications, targeting, and air support environment, plus their ability to sustain operations without relying on the US supply system. Afghanistan has shown that many of the problems in real-world coalition military operations have gotten worse, not better, since the Gulf War.

However, further European military contributions have not been the key priority for Transatlantic cooperation. There were severe limits to how many air and land forces can be based and supported in the area around and inside Afghanistan. Even as bases open up inside and around Afghanistan, problems in cross training, language, interoperability, power projection, and sustainability will limit what Europe can do without imposing more of a military burden than trying to operate a complex mix of forces will be worth.

It is Transatlantic political unity and support that will be most important in this contingency, rather than the levels of force the Europe contributes. There is much that European governments can do in these areas, some of which is already underway:

- **Shaping a post-war Afghanistan is critical.**

  Only a government of all of the Afghans for the benefit of all of the Afghans can both bring internal stability and ensure that the rivalry between Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is kept to a minimum. It may be possible to create such a government simply by giving each major ethnic faction a high degree of autonomy, but any solution will involve a difficult political effort to balance both the factions inside the Afghan opposition and the interests of the nations surrounding Afghanistan.

European diplomacy and aid have already done a great deal to help in this regard, and to reassure Russia and China that the West fully understands that the present war must not be the preface to a “new Great Game.”

Broad Western humanitarian aid can reassure the Afghans, the region, the Middle East, and other Islamic states that the West does not see Islam as any enemy. A non-combatant European nation with good relations with Russia – such as Germany – might well be the best way for the West to take the lead in the political and economic dimensions of nation-building.

- **Facing the true nature of war and providing continuing European political leadership in ensuring public support for the war will be equally critical.**

While the war in Afghanistan is not yet fully over, it is important to look back at the way the war was portrayed in the media and at the lessons for future conflicts. As was the case in Kosovo, there is a certain surreal character to much of the Western reporting and commentary on the war.

There was a great deal of good straight reporting, but much of the reporting took on an almost continuous worst case character with little real insight into the pace and nature of military operations and had a largely “scare” character in dealing with Arab, Islamic, Afghan, and regional reactions. In many cases, the reporting showed little real military expertise or understanding of the tactical realities of war.

This, in part, was a failure of governments to communicate effectively and in the depth required. The US and Britain did not help with public relations efforts that often seem designed more to provide day-to-day assurances that everything is perfect than prepare the world for the reality that wars still occur in a fog, still kill the innocent, drag on in ways that have drastic humanitarian costs, and are fought in cycles of failure and success.

At the same time, far too many European governments made little effort to educate their press in elementary military realities. Worse, far too many European intellectuals and analysts seem unwilling to face the fact that the use of military power is never pleasant or efficient.

No war should ever be above criticism, but there is a real need for European leaders – and those intellectuals and officers with serious military experience to explain military realities and provide support. Few asymmetric wars will
ever be a clear struggle between good and evil, and none will ever be fought on humanitarian terms. Angst, whining, second-guessing, and armchair field marshalling are not going to deal with this or any future problem.

- **Creating a Coordinated Outreach and Media Program:** The Afghan conflict has also shown West needs to make a much better effort to coordinate government information and outreach programs in dealing with non-NATO conflicts.

The US and Europe scarcely need to speak with a common voice, but the effort to use BBC, VOA, and other broadcast efforts in ways that ensure full coverage of all of the nations, ethnic groups, and languages involved is critical. So are efforts at common diplomacy to reduce the tension between the West and Islamic and Arab world, and avoid tensions with nations in the region.

This might well be the prelude to examining how the US and Europe might carry out a broader and more sustained effort, and whether economies of scale would aid both the US and Europe in areas like satellite broadcasting, more effective use of the Internet, and better efforts to use scholarships, visiting fellows, embassy information sections, etc. to build understanding between the West, Central Asia, the Arab World, and Islamic World. There is a need for a lasting effort to avert any “clash of civilizations.”

- **Rooting out Al Qaida and possible allied extremist and terrorist groups is another core task.**

The US and Europe already have strengthened intelligence and low enforcement cooperation. They are cooperating in shutting off the sources of terrorist financing, shutting down cells with terrorist connections and reviewing the character of political movements. This has not only affected Al Qaida operations in Europe but operations all over the world. Both intelligence and law enforcement groups are also attempting to improve international warning. This is a key role for Europe, and one that will be of continuing importance indefinitely into the future.

- **Coordinating in taking the first set of steps to improve transportation, trade, and critical infrastructure security.**

Virtually every Western country is rushing to try to improve the security of its airports and airlines. Many of these efforts, however, still differ sharply from country to country, and less effort is going into coordinating sea and air cargo traffic and inspection. The same is true of physical security efforts. It will not be possible to create common approaches and institutions, or to implement them quickly. More could be done, however, to exchange plans and methods and seek a more common level of protection that affects all aspects of inter-European, inter-US, and Transatlantic activity.
First Things Second: The Broader Response to the Current Crisis”

It would be far, far better if there was only one crisis to be dealt with at a time. The reality is, however, that the struggle against Bin Laden, Al Qaida, and the Taliban is inextricably linked to other ongoing crises and the way in which the West reacts to these other crises will become progressively more important during 2002.

Virtually all of these crises involve long-standing problems for the West with no good answers. While it may be impossible to take a unified approach, however, there is certainly a clear need to take as common and coordinated approach as possible:

- **The Second Intifada and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.** The events of September 11th have demonstrated all too clearly just how important progress is in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and how vital it is for both the US and Europe to make visible action to prove they will do everything possible to bring an end to Second Intifada. This also means increased political pressure on Israel, the Palestinians, and moderate Arab states, while proving that the West can show balance in dealing with both sides. Without progress in this area, Al Qaida may simply have written the road map for new attacks by different groups.

- **The Problem of Iraq.** The Bush Administration has delayed, not avoided, a major military confrontation with Iraq. As best, this means there must be a highly visible roll-back in Iraqi missile efforts and development of weapons of mass destruction. It may mean major US strikes on the Iraqi leadership until it is forced from power if there is any firm evidence linking Iraq to the attacks on the US or if Iraq carries out any significant military adventure or support of terrorist activity on any of its borders or against its Kurds.

Some European countries have tended to underplay this threat or the dangers Iraq poses. The US may or may not be overreacting. It is vital, however, that a quiet Transatlantic dialogue take place on this issue as soon as possible.

There may -- at a minimum -- be a need for a common statement that neither Europe nor the US will tolerate aggressive action by Iraq, and that any such Iraqi action will lead to war. At the same time, this approach would require the US to cooperate with Europe in looking beyond “smart sanctions” to “wise sanctions,” and finding ways to offer the Iraqi people more help on both a humanitarian and development basis.

The other case is planning for the contingency of war in ways where the US avoids unilateral action, where some common set of requirements or red lines
are established for defining what kind of Iraqi conduct would lead to military action, and some common effort is made to define the post-conflict roles Western states should play in helping Iraq create a stable and moderate regime. It is always easy to go to war, and it may even be possible to win one relatively quickly. Winning a peace on both Iraqi and regional terms will be far more difficult.

• **The Problem of Iran.** If Europe has tended to understate the problem of Iraq, the US has overstated the problem of Iran. Many of the senior leaders in the Bush Administration seem to recognize this, even if the US Congress does not.

  Given the acute divisions in Iran, it may be impossible to create any kind of formal US-Iranian relations. It may, however, be possible for the Bush to allow Europe to take a more aggressive approach to investing in Iran with the certainty that ILSA will be avoided with waivers. Similarly, continued European support of any form of US and Iranian dialogue will be of value.

• **The Problem of Pakistan and India:** The US and Europe are already cooperating in diplomatic efforts to prevent a conflict between the two countries and improve the political and economic stability of Pakistan.

  The problem of tensions between India and Pakistan is clearly now far more than a regional problem, and is another case study in the fact that dealing with regional conflicts and “terrorism” will greatly complicate the problem of dealing with more direct threats to the West.

  At the same time, “nation-building” in a nuclear armed Pakistan is likely to be at least as important as efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. A US-European review of ways to back up these initiatives with new aid, trade, and investment activities might do much to reinforce Musharaff and more towards added stability.

• **Dealing with Key Arab and Islamic “Moderates.”** The US and Europe need to collectively and individually reach out to moderate Arab states and the Islamic world. Governments need to rethink their diplomacy, public information, and aid policies to make it clear that there is no clash between civilizations, and that a major effort is being made to support friendly Arab regimes.

  Western governments and intellectuals also need to develop a common understanding that the litmus test of regimes is not whether they are political clones of the West – or provide a political echo of Western views -- but whether they are making a serious effort at secular development and meeting the needs of their people.
Dealing with the Mid and Long-Term: A New Form of Western Alliance

No matter how well Europe and the US deal with the first things, however, this will not create an efficient or cost-effective way of creating the mix of military, homeland defense, and response capabilities to deal with future threats and attacks.

Like the NATO Force Planning Exercise of the early 1960s, the West faces a need to create common programs and capabilities that will take years to develop, fund, and implement. This time, however, the effort will be at least as much civil and economic as military. It will also involve far more issues in terms of both sovereignty and civil liberties.

It is only possible to touch on the full list of efforts required, but even the very effort to draft such a list illustrates the depth of the challenges involved and shows that that decades -- not months or years -- of effort will be involved:

- **Transforming NATO and Developing the Capabilities for Asymmetric Warfare and Homeland Defense:** The US Quadrennial Defense Review already calls for transforming US forces to fight asymmetric warfare and perform homeland defense tasks. The need is equally great for all of NATO. One solution would be a new NATO Force Planning exercise that looked beyond both the US focus on power projection outside of Europe, and the narrow limits of the European Self-Defense Initiative, and explored common approaches to these task.

- **Institutionalizing Cooperation in Counterterrorism:** Parallel, lasting, and well-institutionalized efforts will be needed in intelligence, counter-terrorism, law enforcement and related activities like customs, coast guard and port control, and other activities. Some clear decisions will be needed about the relative role of NATO and the EU versus national action, and the creation of new agreements to detail cooperation and set standards for the West. The role of Interpol will also need reexamination.

- **Developing a New Approach to Biological Attacks:** The West needs to rethink internal security planning, public health, response, and defense efforts to deal with the broad range of CBRN threats. The treatment of hoof and mouth disease and “mad cow” disease is almost a model of how not to deal with such cooperation, and a warning of how much more effort is needed.

Particularly within Europe, there may well be a need for integrated response plans that can rush capabilities from one country to another, and deal with any kind of outbreak of human and agricultural disease. Transatlantic efforts to stockpile vaccines and antibiotics, develop common travel and quarantine procedures, develop common warning and public health approaches could
prove critical in treating and containing an emergency. Cost-effectiveness would also be a critical issue.

- **Creating Common Approaches to Information Warfare and Defense:** Efforts have already been made to cooperate in fighting cybercrime. A dedicated NATO effort to deal with cyberwarfare, backed by clear commercial standards for data protection, liability, recovery capability and other defense measures could be equally critical.

- **A Transatlantic Approach to Transportation, Hazardous Material, High Risk Facility, and Critical Infrastructure Security:** The US and Europe should pursue the creation of common security standards for air, road, rail, and maritime traffic, air port security, port security, security for containers ports and shipments, energy, and hazardous material shipments. Some common standards for the protection of key commuter facilities like subways, critical infrastructure facilities like nuclear power plants, plants producing or storing large amounts of hazardous materials, and key public facilities and government buildings may also be needed.

- **Rethinking Insurance Laws and Regulations:** Some form of common approach to insurance, best practices, liability, and other risks needs to be examined. International insurance and the handling of common risk pools could be critical to limiting cost.

- **Rethinking the Problem of Immigration and Human Rights:** Immigration has long been seen largely as a national problem, and not a global security problem. At the same time, few Western nations have attempted to fully analyze the trade-offs between the need for additional labor to compensate for their aging workforce, the cultural impact on their society, and the need to preserve human rights and tolerate cultural diversity.

  It may well be impossible to develop anything approaching a common strategy to dealing with immigration and security, but the West should at least try. A purely national series of efforts is unlikely to meet either security or human needs and is likely to exacerbate tensions between the West and the Islamic world.

- **Rethinking Foreign Assistance and Outreach Programs in the Light of Terrorist and Asymmetric Threats:** It is at least possible that the West may blunder into a clash of civilization with the Islamic world by default. There is a clear need to coordinate better on information programs, foreign aid, and every other aspect of outreach activity to try to bridge the growing gap between the West and Islamic world.

- **Rethinking the Problem of “Globalism”:** While the relationship between the West and Islamic world is part of the structural problem of terrorism, the West needs to look further and be equally aggressive in making the case for global
economic development and growth. The next set of terrorist attacks could have a very different cause and come from a different part of the world.

The growing tension over “globalism” – which is a reaction to many different patterns of change – illustrates the broader problems that North-South tensions create. In the process, the West needs to look for alliance with the successes in the developing world and pay close attention to the “tigers,” China, and to joint efforts with long-developed Asian powers like Japan.

- **Reshaping the Expansion of NATO and Partnership for Peace**: Both the US and Europe need to reexamine the role of Russia and non-NATO states in security cooperation in the light of the problem of terrorism and asymmetric warfare. It may now be possible to cooperate in new ways, and the incentive for such cooperation seems much stronger.

- **Rethinking Arms and Export Controls**: Much of the Transatlantic debate over the CW, ABM Treaty, BWC, and CTTBT has avoided coming to grips in detail with the threat of asymmetric attacks and terrorism, and has a heritage of focusing on large-scale conventional war fighting.

  The same has been true of export controls. A joint effort at comprehensive review of how to change arms control agreements and export controls -- looking at the CBRN and advanced technology threat as a whole -- is needed to develop a more effective common strategy.

- **Anti-Proliferation, Deterrence, and Retaliation**: The US and Europe should at least consider cooperation in creating a form of extended deterrence and military retaliation against any nation that uses weapons of mass destruction against a nation without such weapons, or aids or tolerates a terrorist movement that uses such weapons.

  At least on the part of the US, this should involve the tacit threat of escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. Arms control and well-meaning security agreements are probably not going to be enough. Limiting the worst forms of asymmetric warfare and terrorism are going to take sticks as well as carrots.

**Beyond September 11th: the Future We Still Had to Face Even if No Attacks Had Ever Occurred**

At one level, this strategy may seem like a daunting set of challenges, not only for 2002, but for the coming decade. At another it may seem like an exaggerated American over-response to what so far has been a relatively narrow set of attacks. The issues this strategy addresses, however, arose long before the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. They have been the some of US concerns ever since the Gulf War, and have been reflected in many US and European discussions of the issues surrounding proliferation, the ABM Treaty
and missile defense, and the need to refocus NATO and many elements of Transatlantic defense.

Certainly, nothing about an effective Transatlantic strategy will be quick, cheap, or easy. Similarly, no one can predict with any certainty just how serious the future threats to Europe and the US will be. In broad terms, however, the world did not change on September 11th, and neither did the priorities for evolving and restructuring the Western alliance.

Many analysts saw that some form of major new terrorist or asymmetric attacks were nearly inevitable for years before these threats became a grim reality. The idea of an easy transition to a “new world order” or the “end of history” has always bordered on mindless intellectual infantilism. The same is true of the idea that end of the Cold War brought an end to major military and security challenges to the West.

Virtually every area where the US and Europe need to improve their cooperation and strategy in 2002 and the years beyond was also a priority on September 10th. If anything has changed, it is that we now have had a clear warning. Equally important, the level of threat we must respond to in the future will be heavily dependent on how well we respond now and over the next few years. At this point in time, limited action, preventive diplomacy, and cooperation may well be able to accomplish a great deal, deter the massive escalation of future threats, and sharply reduce every aspect of the political, human, and economic costs involved.